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The rapid expansion of the conglomerate as a method of corporate
organization during the 1960's has gxven rise to a growing amount of liter-
ature suggesting that the NLRB take a more flexible approach to the
determination of the "appropriate unit" of bargaining. While bargaining
power is specifically not one of the criteria used by the Board in the deter-
mination of the bargaining unit, most arguments for coalition bargaining
have focused on the shift of tactical power in favor of management due to
conglomerate mergers. At least one author has suggested that the bargaining
unit be a mandatory issue in bargaining [1]. Aside from the question of
whether or not the board should consider power as a criteria, the real issue
is how much unions have been hurt by this change in corporate organization.
While there has been a great deal of theoretical speculation on
the impact of the bargaining unit on union power over wage levels, there
has been little empirical testing of the resulting hypotheses. Perhaps
this is due to a general consensus among labor economists on the power
relationships. Kenneth Alexander points this out in his paper on conglom-
erates and collective bargaining [1, p. 362}:
"While economists continue to differ over product-
market effects, there is remarkably lesser disagreement
over the impact of conglomerate mergers on collective
bargaining."
This note uses some empirical evidence on the impact of the
bargaining unit on union wage levels to try to evaluate the argument that
there has been a shift in bargaining power in favor of management.

.There are two basic reasons given for this shift in power:
increased ability to "whipsaw" union' and increased staying power in the
form of "deep pockets." These arguments are virtually identical to those
given for the difference in union power between single-plant and firm-wide
bargaining units * They suggest that eet
e
ris
,
,.;garibus_ unions bargaining in
firm-wide units should have more bargaining power (and therefore higher
wages) than unions bargaining in single plant units. Of course, there may
be a substantial difference between the case where a single union organizes
a firm in single plant units and the case where several unions organize
the firm in different units. There are thus two important questions: How
does differential ability to "whipsaw" unions and increasing staying affect
union power when the firm is organised by a single union, and what is the
effect when the firm is organized by different unions?
"Whips&wing" and "Deep-pockets"
In an earlier paper on the effect of market structure on union
wage rates [2] we presented some empirical results which bear on the first
question. These were:
(1) There is no significant difference in union wage levels
between unions bargaining in plant units (of multi-plant
firms) and unions bargaining in firm-wide units*
(2) Union wage levels increase as the size of che firm increases.
(3) Unions are at a disadvantage when they are dealing with
firms in highly concentrated industries unless the unions
themselves are very strong.

3The first result indicates that management has not used "whipsawing"
to extract lower wage levels,, or if they have, "whipsawing" has been offset
by a. combination of increased union militancy at the local level and manage-
ment's desire to ease union pressure for firm-wide units (in order to have
better control over productivity). Casual empiricism would also suggest
that union "whipsawing" of firms is much more prevalent than the reverse
phenomenon.
The evidence on the "deep-pockets" argument is somewhat less clear.
If "deep-pockets" have a strong effect on wages, the size of the firm should
have a negative effect on wages. In our study (as in studies on plant size),
however j, the size of the firm had a strong positive effect. It would appear
that other forces in the large firm tend to outweigh any increased ability
to "take a strike." On the other hand, our evidence that, unions are at a
disadvantage dealing with firms in highly concentrated industries (unless
the unions are strong) may reflect the "deep-pockets" or "staying power" of
these firms* Thus, the importance of "deep-pockets" for the balance of power
between the union and the firm is ambiguous. It is possible that "deep-pockets"
serve as a constraint ou union power In concentrated oligopolies where competi-
tive forces are not a factor.
This evidence indicates that within individual product lines both
ability to whipsaw the union and "deep-pockets" are. relatively unimportant
for union wage levels, if the firm is organized by a single union. The
possible exception occurs in concentrated oligopolies where unions already
have relatively high wages.

Conglomerate Structure
Our second question bears i are directly on the issue of how conglom-
erate mergers have affected the balance of power between unions and management.
If power has shifted in favor of management, union wage levels should be
lower in firms which are highly diversified and are organized by different
unions in different product lines. In order to test this hypothesis, firms
in our original sample were categorized as being highly diversified or as
mainly producing In one product line. Four sources were used to categorize
the firms: a list of "pure" conglomerates made up by F. Weston and S. K.
Manslnghka [3] for a paper on conglomerates and performance; lists of
conglomerates and diversified firms from Newsfront [6] [7] and Forbes [4] [5]
and our own classification of firms as being conglomerates or highly diversified
(based on information from Moody [&_ Industrlal_jtenual_ 1973) excluding any firms
which were organized by the same union In different product lines. Four
dutaffi? variables ware generated as alternative definitions for test3 of the
hypothesis?
CONGL A value of I for any firm included in Weston ("pure"
conglomerates
)
FCONG A value of 1 for any firm included In Weston, Forbes
or flewfront lists (Conglomerate plus diversified)
ALLCGN A value of 1 for all firms included in Weston, Forbes
,
Newfront or our own list
MYCON A value of 1 for all firms included In our list (Conglom-
erate plus diversified excluding diversified but unionized
by the same union)

5Of the 450 firms in the sample » sixty-four were classified as
"highly-diversified" by at least one of the four definitions." The wage
variable used to test this hypothesis is the hourly wage of janitors in
2
1970 (multiplied by 1000 for convenience) for each individual firm. The
results of the teat of this hypothesis are given in Table 1. In each case
the coefficient on the dummy variable for "highly diversified" firm is nega-
tive and in three of the four alternative definitions it is significant at
the 5% level « "Highly diversified 11 * corporate structure appears to lower union
wage levels about three to four percent (holding other structural variables
constant)
.
These empirical results support the view that corporate diversifi-
e&tiotfcs h&B shifted the balance of bargaining power in favor of management
when this diversification has led to bargaining with different unions in
different product lines. Moreover, our first finding that "whipsawing" and
"daep~pockets" have very little impact when the firm is bargaining with a
singla union suggests that coalition bargaining would tend to offset any
gains la bargaining power by management
,
1
"Theoretical explanations for inclusion of the other explanatory variables
as well as a full explanation of data sources and the sample of firms
is given in {2}.
2
The wage data were taken from union contracts. Of the 450 firms in the
sample, only 367 had data on 1970 janitor v s wages, so our final sample
size is 367.

DUMMY*
Table
Regression Results for Alternative Definitions
'•'Highly diversified firmn3
FCONG AXLCON
* G If.ferant than zero at 5% level.
significantly different than aero at 1% level
Standard errors are. in parenthes
MYCCN
CREG 7.11 7*12** 7.04** 7.01**
(I. 01) (1.00) (1.00) (1.00)
OCR 3.07** 3.17** 3.23** 3.24**
(.84) (.84) (.85) (0.84)
SIZE 128*1** 15.0** 132.9** 134.2**
(24.8) (24.9) (24.7) (24.5)
BUI -20.2 -16.5 -16.2 -20.0
(53.0) (52.8) (52.9) (52.6)
BU2 139.2* 144.8* .6* 148.5*
(71.2) (71.0) (71.0) (70.8)
P; J ~> -395.6** -401.5** -399.0** -399.4**
(96,4) (95.9) (95.9) (95.6)
S0UT3 -330.8** -328.3** -327.1** -322.4**
8) (55.9) (55.7)
AL
-16a -174.5** -176.4** -176.5**
5) 1.4) (43.6) (43.4)
LC/. -14.0 i.9** -13,9** -14.0**
(1.82) (1.61)
DUMMY 6.2 -104. '- -87 -113.0*
5) (44.1) (45.5)
COKSTAHT 19.1 2354.0 2358.1
R
2
.4 i .4' .458
3S 367
See &ppen< lens of explanatory variables.

Conclusions
This note has dealt with only one of a number of issues involved
in the argument over coalition bai the effect of a shift in
bargaining power due to a change in corporate structure* Empirical support
has been given for the argument that conglomerate mergers have shifted
'''tactical power" in favor of management. Yet, this evidence certainly does
not give unambiguous support to coalition bargaining,, Although corporate
diversification .appears to lower union wage levels^ Increases in the size of
the flna increase wage levels. Increasing industry concentration (up to a
point) also seems to increase wages. Tims, the net effect of a merger wave
remains unclear, it is at least questionable to argue that coalition bargain-
lag should be allowed in order to counterbalance the loss of bargaining
power dtxe to conglomerate mergers. In fact, the strongest case for coalition
bargaining is in industries sue -ailroads, newspapers and constructions
whesre it is hoped that coalition bargaining will lead to lower union wage
demands—not iiiereased union power
«

A£j>ev.\dix
Exjalanatpr^ In analysis
UREG Percentage unionised in the industry
CCR Corrected four-digit concentration ratio
SIZE Log of the size of the firm measured by number
of employees
BUI Plant-wide bargaining unit dummy
SU2 Multi-employer bargaining unit (local)
BU3 Industry-wide bargaining unit
SOUTH Dummy for plant is south
RURAL Dummy for plant outside SMSA
LC/T'C ^portion of labor costs in total costs for industry

9Abex K
Allegheny Ludlum H
All is Chambers F, H
American Brands W, F, R
American Metal Climax W, F
American Manuf H
Armour F
v
H
Beatrice Foods F, K
Boise Cascade W, F, H
Borden Company H
Borg Warner W, F, H
Combustion Engineering R
Dart Industries W
s
F, H
Diamond international W, F
s
H
Dressier W, F, H
EPNG H
Eaton Corp W, F
FMC W, F, H
Flintecote H
General Tire F, H
Genesco w> F, R
Georgia Pacific W, F, H
W R Grace W, F, H
Gulf and Western W, F, '
Keublein H
Kaiser Industries F, H
LTV W, F> E
Litton Industrie,;/. W, F, M
Highly Diversified Firms
Loews Corp F, H
Lykes-Youngtown H
Mar cor Corp F, H
Martin Marietta F, H
Mead Corp H
Minn Mining & Mfg F, H
Nabisco R
National Distillers W, F, R
National Lead F, R
North American Rockwell W, F, H
Norton Simon F, R
Occidental Petroleum W, F
Ohlin Matheson W, F , R
aand Indust. fl
PPG Industries F, H
Pacific Holding H
Lp Morris H
Quarker Oats H
Queston Corp R
Rapid-American Corp W, F, H
Corp W, F, R
Sperry Rand F, H
Standard Brands R
TRW W, F
Talley Industries H
Tenneco w, F, R
Textron W, F, H
Union Carbide F, H

10
U.S. Plywood -Champion Papei
U. V. Industries
U. S. Tobacco H
Universal Oil F, H
VRW Indusi
F, H Jim Walter Corp H
Warner Lambert H
Williams Bros. H
Zapata Nome S3 H
W Listed in Wes ten
F Listed tin Forbes or Newsfr*
H On our list based, on M atrial Manual
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